29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29)

Joint Policy Paper

YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS FORUM

LSU

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Youth Organizations Forum
National Council of Swedish Child and Youth Organizations

This policy paper reflects solely the views, approaches, and demands of the participants from the exchange programme on environmental sustainability and justice, jointly organised by the Youth Organizations Forum (GoFor) and the National Council of Swedish Child and Youth Organizations (LSU) in November 1-5, 2024. It represents the collective insights and perspectives shared during the programme and does not necessarily reflect the official positions or policies of LSU.

Where the term 'LSU' is used in this paper, it refers exclusively to the participants from LSU who took part in the exchange programme, and not to the whole organisation.

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Preamble

To the Parties and the Secretariat of the UNFCCC,

This policy paper represents the collective voice of youth organisations in Türkiye and Sweden. The paper addresses the key climate-related issues the youth faces in these respective countries, aligning with the agenda of COP29. The main aim of this document is to express in detail the key demands, needs and issues of youth in Türkiye and Sweden, and convey these within the relevant negotiation rooms of COP29.

The policy paper is prepared not by technocrats but by the youth, for the youth. The document is a novel result of an exchange programme held between the National Youth Council of Türkiye (also known as Youth Organisations Forum, GoFor) and the National Council of Swedish Children and Youth Organisations (LSU) on the theme of environmental sustainability and justice. During the programme, participants engaged in numerous thematic discussions, ranging from climate finance to environmental conflicts, and addressed how youth rights progress or mostly backlash within such themes. Based on the discussions, participants worked for numerous days to create viable and effective policy recommendations, mainly revolving around the agenda of COP29. Thereby, the key findings and outcomes of the programme forms the core of this policy paper. Swedish and Turkish youth came together for their rights, worked towards progressing and advocating for their rights, and; consequently, created this policy paper.

This policy paper conveys one fundamental view: Transition towards a post-growth economy in global scale, where economic competition is replaced by cooperation, has become an urgent need rather than a mere demand, and we, the youth organisations of Türkiye and Sweden have already begun to advocate for such a transition at multiple levels. COP29 stands out before us as the most effective platform, where we will demonstrate the strongest form of our struggle against socio-ecologically exploitative economic policies. This policy paper constitutes the written form of such struggle of ours, the youth of Türkiye and Sweden.

GoFor and LSU

List of key demands

Demand 1: Legally mandate youth representation

Demand 2: Implement participatory budgeting for climate finance

Demand 3: Establish youth-led climate trusts

Demand 4: Shift from loans to grants

Demand 5: Decommodify climate finance

Demand 6: Ensure equitable resource redistribution

Demand 7: Guarantee green jobs for youth

Demand 8: Implement public housing for climate resilience

Demand 9: Establish community-based resource management

Demand 10: Integrate indigenous knowledge

Demand 11: Secure land rights

Demand 12: Youth-led adaptation initiatives

Demand 13: Protect public assets from privatisation

Demand 14: Effectively implement universal basic services

Demand 15: Legislate protection of youth activists and youth organisations

Demand 16: Abandon the flawed metric of GDP as the key indicator of progress

Demand 17: Implement progressive taxation and wealth redistribution

Demand 18: Decarbonise and decommodify essential sectors

1. Introduction

1.1. Youth and the climate crisis

Multiple environmental crises, including climate crisis, are at the forefront of today's global agenda due to the dual threats they pose: i) the ecologically deteriorating impacts inherent to these crises, and ii) their interactions with the existing economic and social inequalities, which further exacerbate such disparities at multiple levels. Youth occupy a unique position within this context for three main reasons.

Firstly, youth is the group that will be exposed to the long-term adverse effects of environmental crises the most due to them being in the early stages of their lives. Secondly, despite producing the least carbon emissions, youth remain among the most vulnerable social groups to the acute impacts of the climate crisis. Lastly, while already facing severe violations of fundamental civil, political, economic and social rights, current approaches to tackling the climate crisis further exacerbate such violations, instead of protecting and progressing these rights.

1.2. A fundamental contradiction: economic growth v. environmental sustainability

The current policies supposedly aiming to tackle climate change and other environmental crises, such as biodiversity loss, overlook the fundamental contradiction, which is one of the key drivers of climate change: pursuit of infinite economic growth through the utilisation of finite resources.

It is now apparent that the world has finite resources and there exists planetary boundaries, in which humanity can safely operate within a stable and resilient environment. Crossing these boundaries increases the risk of destabilising Earth's systems, potentially leading to severe socio-ecological consequences. As of 2023, six out of nine boundaries, which are all interdependent, are crossed purely due to human activities.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight that merely stating human activities as the main cause of crossing these boundaries is insufficient. The kinds and forms of human activities and the main

actors involved in these activities are pivotal in determining the politics of climate change. It is now evident that the main human activity that drives the climate crisis is the relentless pursuit of infinite economic growth, which is comprehended by mainstream/neoclassical economists as the foundational indicator of development. The main actors of such activity are the power elites; that is, the ones who hold economic and political power throughout all dimensions of society, such as the richest 10%, big corporations and bureaucrats holding key offices. These actors promote a certain economic model as the only viable option since it facilitates the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few, thereby preserving and reinforcing the dominance of existing power structures.

This economic model is based on assumptions of neoclassical economics. Grounded upon the assumption that economic growth is synonymous with development and human progress, neoclassical economics argues that markets should be set free with minimum intervention by the government as resources are best allocated in such a setting, the key towards achieving economic growth. In this context, the climate crisis is framed as a *market externality*, which refers to the costs and impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and other environmentally harmful activities not being reflected in market dynamics, such as the prices of goods and services. This framing births policies seeking to internalise the environmental costs of market-based economic growth. These policies thus unleash a set of measures that promotes privatisation, financialisation, profit maximisation and deregulation to further establish markets as the leading actor of sustainable development. Policies like carbon pricing is an outcome of such an approach.

Nevertheless, it has been proven numerous times that the climate crisis is not a market failure but rather an inherent feature of an economic system that prioritises economic gains for the few. In such a system, natural resources are perceived as commodities, the only role of which is to be utilised for economic gains. Land, forests, water bodies, and even the atmosphere are reduced to economic inputs, valued only insofar as they can generate profit. The result is ever-increasing crossing of planetary boundaries due to overexploitation of ecosystems, as

seen in the rampant deforestation of the Amazon and constant sympathy towards extracting fossil fuels for economic expansion despite their well-known role in driving the climate crisis.

Contrary to mainstream economic narratives, development is not equal to economic growth. True development encompasses improving human well-being, reducing inequality, protection and progression of human rights, and ensuring ecological stability. However, 'the ladder' reaching to such conceptualisation of development has been being 'kicked-away' by the Global North countries via their influence in key multilateral agencies. These countries, which have historically contributed the most to greenhouse gas emissions, continue to push for economic expansion even as they exceed safe planetary limits. Meanwhile, countries in the Global South are pressured to adopt growth models that replicate the socio-ecological harm already wrought by the North.

This is the exact point where environmental justice comes into the picture. The unequal dynamic described above reflects the structural inequalities embedded in the global economic system. The wealthiest nations and corporations are disproportionately responsible for emissions, yet the impacts of the climate crisis fall most heavily on the poorest and most vulnerable populations. This is evident in the growing prevalence of climate-induced disasters, such as floods and droughts, which disproportionately affect low-income countries despite their minimal contributions to global emissions.

Therefore, the global economic system is marked by a fundamental contradiction: the relentless pursuit of economic growth versus the conservation of finite environmental resources. This inherent contradiction not only perpetuates existing inequalities but also exacerbates new forms of injustice in the context of the climate crisis.

1.3. Toward a post-growth future

The climate crisis is not merely a result of aggregate human activity but of specific economic structures and actors that prioritise growth at all costs. The equation of economic growth with development, underpinned by neoclassical principles, is a primary driver of environmental destruction, perpetuating a cycle of socio-ecological exploitation and inequality. Addressing

climate change, thus, requires challenging the foundational logic of our economic system and embracing alternative models that prioritise both human and planetary health.

"Youth are not just future stakeholders; we are citizens, rights-holders and active participants shaping the world today and in the years ahead".[1] Thus, as the youth organisations of Türkiye and Sweden, we call today for a new global economic system that transcends growth-centric paradigms, aiming to eliminate unjust disparities and foster a truly equitable and sustainable future. We reject the narrative of 'there is no alternative' and push any restricting boundaries to reimagine our economic and social systems. We advocate for policies that promote redistribution, investments in public goods and services (e.g. healthcare, education and renewable energy), and effective environmental and economic regulations, all of which are systematically disregarded by the current dominant economic thought. We promote the redefinition of development and progress based on the measuring of human and ecological well-being, such as life satisfaction, equality, ecological health and the degree of ability to exercise rights. We call to move beyond the pursuit of expanding a flawed metric, GDP, which fails to account for environmental degradation and social inequalities.

The rest of this policy paper, including the policy recommendations, are thus written out through such social, economic and environmental aspirations. The socio-ecological issues faced by youth in Türkiye and Sweden are analysed via such conceptualisation of development and policy recommendations are crafted via such reimagination of economic and social systems.

2. Key challenges and their impact on youth rights: the cases of Türkiye and Sweden

As discussed in the introduction, the climate crisis is not just an environmental issue. It is also deeply entangled with economic, social and political structures that (re)produce inequalities. Youth and youth organisations in Türkiye and Sweden face several interconnected challenges that hinder their ability to effectively tackle the climate crisis and further undermine their fundamental rights. These challenges are as follows:

[1] European Youth Forum. (2024). Key priorities of the European Youth Forum for the COP29.

- deregulation and private governance,
- lack of effective adaptation policies,
- right-wing policies and anti-democratic measures.

Below, how these challenges violate youth rights, including the right to participation work, housing, health and education is explored.

2.1. Deregulation and private governance

Deregulation is not merely the reduction of government oversight in economic and environmental matters. It is a deliberate reconfiguration of power that shifts authority from the public to the private sector. This transition is deeply embedded within the assumptions of neoclassical economics, which prioritises marker mechanisms over state intervention in addressing economic, social and environmental challenges.

In the context of climate governance, deregulation facilitates the emergence of private environmental governance, where corporations and private actors assume a central role in managing environmental issues. Under such a model, environmental standards and practises are set, monitored, and enforced by market actors rather than state institutions, resulting in prioritisation of profitability and shareholder interests over social and ecological welfare. Practices such as carbon offset programmes, net-zero pledges, and carbon trading and pricing can be given as examples to this model. Such mechanisms fundamentally reflect and reinforce the existing power structures of the current global economic system. The influence of corporate lobbies and financial institutions ensures that environmental governance is aligned with the imperatives of profit maximisation, often at the expense of meaningful and just climate action.

This is where the fundamental problems with existing climate finance frameworks stem from. In the private governance model, climate finance is increasingly administered through private channels such as multinational corporations, financial institutions and public-private partnerships. These private actors often dominate climate finance frameworks to make them aligned with the imperatives of profitability and risk mitigation instead of equity, welfare and justice. To illustrate, the Global North, historically responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas

emissions, commits to mobilising $100 billion annually to support the Global South in regards to building climate resilience. However, much of this funding takes the form of loans, rather than grants, increasing the debt burdens of recipient countries. This financialization of climate aid ensures that capital flows continue to benefit the Global North through interest payments and investment returns, even as the Global South faces the most severe impacts of climate change.

In Türkiye, deregulation has significantly reshaped environmental governance, with market actors increasingly dominating decision-making processes. The liberalisation of key sectors, such as energy and mining, has allowed private corporations to exploit natural resources with minimal oversight. For instance, energy privatisation policies have led to the proliferation of coal-fired power plants, often justified by the state as necessary for economic growth. Despite the well-documented environmental and health impacts of coal, these projects continue to receive state support in the form of subsidies and tax incentives, highlighting the prioritisation of short-term economic gains over long-term sustainability. Similarly, deregulation in the mining sector has facilitated large-scale extractive projects, particularly in ecologically sensitive regions. The controversial gold mining operations in Mount Ida serve as a stark example. Despite widespread public opposition due to deforestation, water pollution, and displacement of local communities, especially the Tahtacı Alevis, the government has granted extensive concessions to foreign and domestic companies. This reflects a broader trend where environmental regulations are weakened or bypassed to attract investment, often under the guise of promoting economic growth.

In Sweden, the impact of deregulation has been more nuanced but equally significant. While Sweden is often perceived as a leader in environmental sustainability, recent shifts in political priorities have led to the gradual erosion of regulatory frameworks. The rise of right-wing political influence has resulted in policies that favour business interests, including tax cuts for corporations and reduced environmental oversight. A clear example is the deregulation of Sweden's forestry sector, where clear-cutting practices have been allowed to continue despite their devastating impact on biodiversity and carbon sequestration. Private forestry companies, which dominate the sector, have considerable influence over policymaking, often resisting

stricter environmental regulations. Furthermore, the government's recent proposal to merge the Ministry of Climate with the Ministry of Business and Enterprises illustrates a broader shift towards prioritising economic interests over just climate action. The mining sector in Sweden also highlights the tensions between deregulation and environmental justice. Plans to expand mining operations in the Sápmi region—traditional lands of the Indigenous Sámi people—have sparked significant controversy. These projects, often justified on the grounds of resource extraction for renewable energy technologies, threaten local ecosystems and the livelihoods of Sámi communities. The government's failure to adequately consult with Indigenous groups and enforce environmental protections reflects the structural inequalities embedded in the deregulated private governance model.

2.1.1. The impact of deregulation and private governance on youth rights

Right to participation: In deregulated frameworks, the shift of governance from state-led to private-led mechanisms often excludes youth from meaningful participation. Decisions are increasingly made by corporate boards, financial institutions, or public-private partnerships where youth voices are rarely represented. For instance, climate finance projects, such as carbon offset schemes or green infrastructure, are designed and implemented without consulting local youth groups or communities.

Right to work: The structural shift toward deregulation and private environmental governance significantly impacts youth employment opportunities, particularly in the green economy. While deregulation is often promoted as a means to stimulate economic growth and job creation, these benefits are unevenly distributed. **In Türkiye,** the privatisation of renewable energy projects has created job opportunities in the sector. However, these jobs often lack stability, fair wages, and worker protections, as private companies prioritise profit over labour rights. Young workers are disproportionately affected, as they are more likely to be employed in precarious, low-wage positions without benefits or job security. **In Sweden,** green jobs in industries like renewable energy and forestry are largely controlled by private corporations. These companies often prioritise efficiency and cost-cutting, leading to a workforce dominated by short-term contracts and limited career advancement opportunities for young people. The focus on

financial returns over social equity means that youth are often excluded from the benefits of a green transition, reinforcing existing inequalities in the labor market.

Right to housing: Deregulation in housing markets, combined with the environmental impacts of private governance, exacerbates housing insecurity for youth. Deregulated housing policies have led to rising costs and a lack of affordable housing, disproportionately affecting young people. Private real estate developments, often justified under the guise of sustainable urban planning, prioritise profitability over social equity, leading to gentrification and displacement. For example, green building initiatives, while environmentally beneficial, often cater to higher-income groups, making eco-friendly housing inaccessible to youth from lower socio-economic backgrounds. This structural exclusion highlights how market-driven solutions fail to address the intersecting crises of housing affordability and environmental sustainability.

Right to education: Private actors increasingly shape curricula and educational initiatives in both Türkiye and Sweden, focusing on marketable skills rather than fostering critical environmental consciousness. For instance, partnerships between corporations and educational institutions often prioritise technical training for green jobs over comprehensive education on environmental justice and systemic critiques of the economic model driving climate change. This limited approach to education fails to equip youth with the knowledge and tools needed to advocate for systemic change, reinforcing a cycle where they are prepared to fit into the existing economic structure rather than challenge it.

Right to health: The environmental and social consequences of deregulated governance models also undermine youth health rights. Climate finance projects driven by private actors often exacerbate environmental degradation, particularly in marginalised communities. **In Türkiye**, large-scale renewable energy projects have sometimes led to local environmental issues, such as water scarcity or loss of biodiversity, which have direct health implications. Youth living in these areas experience higher exposure to environmental risks without adequate health infrastructure to mitigate these impacts. Similarly, **in Sweden**, mining projects in northern regions, contribute to pollution and ecological disruption, affecting the health of Indigenous and

non-Indigenous youth alike. These projects prioritise economic outputs over the well-being of affected communities, perpetuating health disparities.

2.2. Lack of effective and meaningful adaptation policies

Adaptation policies are designed to help societies cope with the inevitable consequences of climate change. These policies typically focus on enhancing resilience to climate impacts, such as rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and disruptions to food and water security. However, despite widespread acknowledgment of the need for adaptation, the existing policies are insufficient, fragmented, and often ineffective. This failure stems from the broader structural problems inherent in the current global economic system that underpins climate governance. Youth—as future generations inheriting the consequences of today's climate inaction—are particularly vulnerable to these systemic failures.

To illustrate, adaptation funding often flows from developed nations to developing ones, based on politically motivated criteria that do not necessarily align with the needs of local youth populations. In this context, adaptation becomes a tool for maintaining power structures, rather than a means to ensure social and environmental justice. This reflects the ongoing legacy of colonial exploitation and economic imperialism, where wealthier countries (those responsible for the majority of historical emissions) impose conditions on aid and funding, further entrenching global inequalities.

Thus, adaptation is about more than just addressing physical risks; it is also about ensuring that communities have the resources, infrastructure, and political agency to navigate and overcome those risks. Unfortunately, adaptation policies in Türkiye and Sweden are often insufficient in empowering youth or integrating their perspectives and needs into climate governance.

In Türkiye, adaptation policies are often fragmented and insufficient, particularly in rural areas and marginalised communities. For youth in these regions, the lack of access to meaningful adaptation initiatives exacerbates their vulnerability. For instance, as young people living in areas prone to droughts, extreme weather events, and water scarcity, they face the intersecting challenges of climate crisis and economic hardship. The state of youth in urban areas are

somewhat similar. Due to the housing crisis, the youth are pushed into non-resilient neighbourhoods, where the infrastructure is highly prone to climate--induced disasters. The absence of effective adaptation measures, such as loss and damage fund for the marginalised and low-income youth groups, leave them vulnerable to the impacts of the climate crisis. Climate-induced migration, both internal and cross-border, further impacts youth, as the lack of infrastructure and government support leaves them without the means to adapt to the shifting realities of their environments.

In Sweden, while there is more awareness about climate risks and a stronger institutional framework, youth from marginalised communities, such as indigenous groups in the northern parts of the country, are often excluded from the adaptation discourse. For example, indigenous youth face the added burden of environmental degradation caused by extractive industries, such as mining and forestry, which are often justified by state policies that prioritise economic growth over environmental sustainability. These policies ignore the deep knowledge and needs of local youth, who are the current and future custodians of their ecosystems. Moreover, the push for privatised green energy solutions or market-driven adaptation measures, such as eco-innovation parks or climate-resilient infrastructures in urban areas, often leaves rural and marginalised youth without access to the necessary resources to cope with climate impacts. These market-based approaches fail to recognise the structural barriers faced by youth in low-income communities, Indigenous groups, or rural areas, who are more likely to be disproportionately impacted by the climate crisis.

2.2.1. The impact of lack of effective and meaningful adaptation policies on youth rights

Right to health: Without effective adaptation policies, youth are exposed to a higher risk of climate-related harms such as extreme weather events, droughts, floods, and temperature extremes. In regions where youth unemployment is already high, or where social infrastructure is underdeveloped, young people lack the resilience and resources to cope with these impacts.

Right to housing: The right to housing is directly threatened when adaptation policies fail to provide climate-resilient infrastructure, such as affordable, safe housing in vulnerable areas. **In**

Turkey, many young people from rural areas are forced to move to urban areas where they end up living in informal settlements or overcrowded conditions due to the lack of affordable, climate-resilient housing. **In Sweden**, while the infrastructure may be more advanced, marginalised youth—especially Indigenous youth—are experiencing displacement from their ancestral lands, facing housing insecurity when their homes and communities are disrupted by climate-related events or resource extraction activities.

Right to participation: Adaptation policies are often developed by those in positions of power—governments, multinational corporations, and international financial institutions—which fail to fully include the voices of young people, particularly those from marginalised communities. This lack of participation not only violates youth rights but also perpetuates a cycle of exclusion from the decision-making processes that determine their today and future.

Right to work: The lack of adaptation policies creates economic insecurity for youth, especially those in vulnerable sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, and tourism—industries directly impacted by climate change. **In Türkiye**, young people working in agriculture, for instance, face income instability due to unpredictable weather patterns, resulting in diminished harvests or increased costs of living. Without comprehensive adaptation strategies, these youth are unable to secure sustainable livelihoods or plan for long-term economic mobility. Instead, they are forced into precarious, low-wage work, deepening the cycle of poverty and inequality.

2.3. Right-wing policies and anti-democratic measures

Right-wing policies in both Türkiye and Sweden pose significant barriers to youth engagement in climate governance. The policies often deprioritise climate action, favouring economic growth and business interests over environmental sustainability. They also suppress dissent and limit the space for youth advocacy, particularly when it challenges the status quo.

In Türkiye, youth-led climate activism is met with strong opposition from the government, especially when it challenges projects that prioritise economic growth over environmental protection. A notable example is the protests against the deforestation and biodiversity loss caused by gold mining in Mount Ida. These protests, driven mainly by youth and youth

organisations advocating for environmental justice, are met with heavy police crackdowns, intimidation, and legal repression. The government's response highlights the state's role in defending economic interests of the few—in this case, mining companies and resource extraction industries—while suppressing any challenges to the established order. Youth voices are also silenced through the control of media outlets by the government. By minimising or outright censoring coverage of climate activism, the government restricts youth access to platforms that could amplify their concerns.

In Sweden, the rise of right-wing populist politics has seen a shift towards more exclusionary policies, particularly with regard to immigrants and refugees. The increase in anti-immigrant rhetoric and the targeting of marginalised communities, including youth asylum seekers, severely restricts young asylum seekers from contributing meaningfully to climate governance debates. The participation of such marginalised youth groups in decision-making processes regarding the climate crisis is particularly crucial as their rights are being systematically violated, making them much more vulnerable to the impacts of the climate crisis.

2.3.1. Impact of right-wing policies and anti-democratic measures on youth rights

Right to participation: One of the most immediate impacts of right-wing policies is the exclusion of youth from political participation. Youth rights to freedom of expression, participation, and the right to be heard in democratic processes are often suppressed under such policies. By limiting civil society spaces and curbing youth activism, these policies effectively deny young people the opportunity to influence decisions that will impact their lives and the planet's future.

Freedom of association: The crackdown on climate protests not only silences youth in the moment but also undermines their ability to organise and mobilise for long-term change. Repressive tactics such as mass arrests, surveillance, and police violence instil fear, discouraging participation and stifling youth activism. These actions disrupt networks of youth-led organisations, preventing them from building the solidarity and coordination necessary for effective climate action. They also create legal barriers that further discourage protest, such as criminal records or fines. Additionally, by suppressing both physical and digital

activism, these crackdowns limit youth's ability to engage in multiple forms of protest, ultimately weakening their political voice and agency in shaping climate policies.

3. Policy demands

This policy paper emphasises how economic systems, power imbalances and global inequalities perpetuate environmental degradation and social injustice. The following recommendations aim to address these underlying structural issues, ensuring that youth, particularly those from marginalised backgrounds, can exercise their rights and play a central role in climate governance.

3.1. Embedding youth participation in climate governance structures

Demand 1: Legally mandate youth representation

Integrate youth representatives with decision-making power into national economic councils, climate finance boards, and international climate negotiations.

Demand 2: Implement participatory budgeting for climate finance

Implement participatory budgeting processes that allocate climate funds—including those from the Green Climate Fund and other international mechanisms—directly to youth-led initiatives. These funds should target sectors where youth face the greatest economic vulnerabilities, such as climate-resilient housing and green employment programs.

Demand 3: Establish youth-led climate trusts

Establish climate trusts managed and monitored by youth organisations to directly oversee investments in sustainable infrastructure and community resilience projects, ensuring funds are used equitably and transparently.

3.2. Reforming climate finance to address structural inequalities

Demand 4: Shift from loans to grants

Transition international climate finance from loan-based systems, which exacerbate debt dependency in the Global South, to grant-based systems. Grants should be earmarked for youth-driven adaptation projects.

Demand 5: Decommodify climate finance

Halt the privatisation and financialization of climate resilience efforts. Redirect investments from market-based instruments, like carbon trading, to publicly owned climate projects that prioritise local employment and infrastructure, particularly in vulnerable communities.

Demand 6: Ensure equitable resource redistribution

Establish a Global Youth Resilience Fund financed through progressive taxation on the wealthiest corporations, particularly those in fossil fuels, mining, and agribusiness. This fund should support initiatives led by youth from economically disadvantaged regions to combat climate impacts.

3.3. Strengthening social and economic rights

Demand 7: Guarantee green jobs for youth

Implement a public employment guarantee for youth in sectors critical to the green transition, such as renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and climate-resilient infrastructure. These programs should offer livable wages, job security, and pathways for career advancement, countering the precarity created by deregulated labour markets.

Demand 8: Implement public housing for climate resilience

Develop large-scale, publicly funded climate-resilient housing projects to address housing insecurity. These projects should prioritise youth and low-income populations, focusing on affordable, energy-efficient housing that reduces both carbon emissions and living costs.

3.4. Strengthen adaptation policies to protect indigenous youth rights

Demand 9: Establish community-based resource management

Adaptation strategies must prioritise community-led governance of forests, water and land. Indigenous communities, particularly youth, should have decision-making authority over how resources are managed in response to climate risks. Parties and international bodies should facilitate the development of community-driven adaptation plans, which are tailored to the specific environmental and cultural contexts of indigenous territories.

Demand 10: Integrate indigenous knowledge

Recognise and leverage indigenous ecological knowledge in climate adaptation efforts. This includes traditional methods of resource conservation, sustainable agriculture, and disaster risk reduction. Establish knowledge-sharing platforms where indigenous youth can collaborate with policymakers and scientists, ensuring a holistic approach to adaptation.

Demand 11: Secure land rights

Strengthen legal frameworks to secure land tenure and water rights for Indigenous communities, preventing displacement due to climate projects or resource extraction. Ensure adaptation projects respect free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) principles, giving Indigenous communities the right to approve or reject initiatives affecting their lands.

Demand 12: Youth-led adaptation initiatives

Allocate dedicated climate finance to support adaptation projects led by Indigenous youth. These projects could include community-managed renewable energy systems, sustainable forestry practices, and climate-resilient infrastructure.

3.5. Countering the impacts of right-wing and anti-democratic policies

Demand 13: Protect public assets from privatisation

Halt the privatisation of public utilities, natural resources, and key infrastructure. Reclaim these assets under democratic public control, ensuring they serve social and environmental needs rather than profit motives. This includes prioritising access to energy, water, and transportation for youth and vulnerable populations.

Demand 14: Effectively implement universal basic services

Implement universal basic services (UBS) frameworks, guaranteeing free access to essential services such as education, healthcare, and public transportation. Climate finance should support the expansion of UBS to mitigate the socioeconomic impacts of climate change on youth.

Demand 15: Legislate protection of youth activists and youth organisations

Enact strong legal protections for youth climate activists and organisations, ensuring their rights to protest, freedom of speech, and assembly are safeguarded. Establish public funding for youth legal defence in cases of government repression or corporate litigation. Establish, progress and widen the scope of the Council of Europe's "recommendation CM/Rec(2024)6 of the Committee of Minister to member States on young people and climate action" as the model in legislating protection of youth activists and youth organisations.

3.6. Transition to a post-growth economic model

Demand 16: Abandon the flawed metric of GDP as the key indicator of progress

Replace GDP with alternative metrics such as the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) or Doughnut Economics framework, which measure human and ecological well-being. These indicators should guide public investment and policy priorities at national and international levels.

Demand 17: Implement progressive taxation and wealth redistribution

Implement progressive taxation on wealth, corporate profits, and financial transactions, reallocating resources to fund public goods such as education, green infrastructure, and

healthcare. Ensure these revenues support youth empowerment initiatives and climate adaptation projects in economically vulnerable regions.

Demand 18: Decarbonise and decommodify essential sectors

Nationalise key industries such as energy, transportation, and healthcare, ensuring that their operations align with climate goals and prioritise social equity. Establish strict regulatory frameworks to phase out fossil fuels while expanding publicly owned renewable energy systems.